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Abstract
Fooling deep neural networks with adversarial input have
exposed a significant vulnerability in the current state-of-the-art
systems in multiple domains. Both black-box and white-box ap-
proaches have been used to either replicate the model itself or to
craft examples which cause the model to fail. In this work, we
propose a framework which uses multi-objective evolutionary
optimization to perform both targeted and un-targeted black-
box attacks on Automatic Speech Recognition (ASR) systems.
We apply this framework on two ASR systems: Deepspeech and
Kaldi-ASR, which increases the Word Error Rates (WER) of
these systems by upto 980%, indicating the potency of our ap-
proach. During both un-targeted and targeted attacks, the adver-
sarial samples maintain a high acoustic similarity of 0.98 and
0.97 with the original audio.
1. Introduction
Advancements in deep learning have improved the state-of-the-
art systems in domains like computer vision, natural language
processing and speech recognition. Recent studies [1, 2, 3] have
shown that these systems can be easily fooled with carefully
crafted inputs. For example, [4, 5] showed that an image classi-
fier could be fooled into classifying an image to a label of choice
by introducing small perturbations to the input image which are
imperceptible to humans. ASR systems are becoming ubiqui-
tous with the pervasiveness of smart devices. With the success
of digital assistants, voice is replacing text as the main mode
of communication with these devices. Along with automating
mundane human activities, these digital assistants can now ac-
complish complex tasks which may require sensitive user data.
For example, Alexa [6] can now access a user’s bank details and
perform actions like checking the balance and making credit-
card payments. Therefore, it is essential that ASR systems are
not susceptible to adversarial attacks. Attacks on ASR systems
can broadly be classified based on two attributes: i) model trans-
parency, and ii) intent of the attack.
Attacks based on model transparency: Attacks in which the
adversary has access to the internals of an ASR system (network
structure, weights, etc.) are known as White Box attacks [2]. At-
tacks of this kind are rare as commercial ASR systems seldom
expose their internal working to users. On the other hand, Black
Box attacks, where the attacker only has access to the input-
output pairs of the model, are more probable. Attacks based
on intent: The intention of an adversarial attack can be either
to cause failure or manipulate the system towards an end-goal.
The former is known as un-targeted attacks where the intent is
to make the ASR system generate wrong output for a given au-
dio sample. In the latter, known as targeted attacks, the aim is to
perturb the input in such a way that the ASR outputs a desired
text. While un-targeted attacks just degrade an ASR system’s
performance, targeted attacks are dangerous as they can manip-
Figure 1: Overview of the adversarial example generation
framework for ASR systems
ulate actions taken by digital assistants.
Previous works like [7] generate adversarial samples for
ASR systems by adding perturbations to MFCC features and
perform lossy reconstruction of the speech signal in the time
domain. This lossy reconstruction makes the perturbations per-
ceptible to the human ear. [8] proposes a method which en-
ables the propagation of gradients to the MFCC reconstruction
layer. They perform white box targeted attacks on Mozilla’s
Deepspeech model [9] and obtain adversarial samples which are
99.9% similar to the desired target text. Furthermore, [10, 11]
utilise non-linearities of microphones in smart devices to gen-
erate spurious commands (adversarial examples with frequency
40 Khz.) and issue malicious commands to digital assistants.
Another kind of attack proposed in [12], intends to generate
sounds that are interpreted as voice commands by devices but
are unrecognisable to humans. These attacks, although pow-
erful, are usually easy to detect and can be prevented using
filters. [13] use a genetic algorithm to perform black-box at-
tacks, with an intent of mis-classifying audio samples contain-
ing short speech commands. [14] extended this approach to
work on longer phrases and sentences. Their approach is lim-
ited to ASR systems which give access to the last layer (logits)
and requires the knowledge of the model’s loss function. Hence
it can be considered as a grey-box attack at best.
In this work, we consider adversarial audio generation as a
multi-objective optimization problem which achieves a balance
between conflicting objectives: (i) increasing text dissimilarity,
and (ii) maintaining acoustic similarity. We propose a frame-
work which is algorithm agnostic and generates near-optimal
solutions in both un-targeted and targeted settings. We show
that our approach works well with two genetic optimizers: (i) a
simple Multi-Objective Genetic Algorithm (MOGA) [15], and
(ii) Elitist Non-dominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm (NSGA-
II) [16]. We perform black-box attacks on two popular ASR
systems:Deepspeech [9] and Kaldi-ASR (TDNN chain model)
[17], and present both empirical and human evaluation results 1
1The project web page is at https://shreyakhare.github.io/audio-
adversarial/
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Figure 2: System Architecture
2. Approach
Multi-objective optimization is a process of finding solutions
which must satisfy more than one conflicting objectives. In such
cases, often there is no single optimal solution. The interaction
among different objectives gives rise to a set of compromised
solutions known as trade-off, non-dominated, non-inferior or
Pareto-optimal solutions [18].2
Before moving forward, we define the following terms: (i)
dominance: a is said to dominate b iff a is no worse than b
in every fitness objective (blue points in Fig. 3). If this con-
straint does not hold between a and b, then they are called non-
dominating individuals, (ii) pareto front: a set of mutually non-
dominating individuals all of which are pareto-optimal (indi-
viduals on the red line in Fig. 3). There can be multiple pareto
fronts in the search space, and (iii) crowding distance: an indi-
vidual is said to have high crowding distance if there are many
individuals in its vicinity. It indicates the density of the area
around the individual in the search space. For more details, the
reader is advised to refer [19].
As with any evolutionary system, in each generation our
framework scores candidate solutions to determine which in-
dividuals are the fittest. They are allowed to reproduce using
crossover and mutation which results in fitter individuals (bet-
ter solutions) over time. The approach to generate adversarial
samples is shown in Fig. 2. The blue boxes represent algorithm
agnostic parts of the framework. Only the mating pool selection
changes with the choice of algorithm.
Evaluation of fitness score is arguably the most impor-
tant step in evolutionary algorithms. It decides which individ-
uals survive and therefore prunes the search space. Our goal is
to generate audibly similar samples which maximize errors in
ASR systems. Parameterizing a fitness function to evaluate this
criterion is hard. Therefore we breakdown the fitness function
into two components, each of which quantifies a desired prop-
erty: (i) acoustic similarity – the Euclidean distance between
MFCC [20] of the original and generated audio samples, and (ii)
text dissimilarity – edit distance between the texts generated by
the ASR system when the original and generated samples are
provided as inputs. To the best of our knowledge, we are the
first to use such a multi-objective fitness function to optimize
an adversarial audio generator.
2We use the terms ‘Solution’ and ‘Individual’ interchangeably
In the un-targeted setting, the generated sample is consid-
ered fitter if it has high acoustic similarity with the input au-
dio and if the text generated has high edit distance with respect
to the ASR output. Whereas in the targeted setting, a fit solu-
tion, while having high acoustic similarity with the input audio,
should also have low edit distance when compared with the de-
sired text.
Once fitness values are computed for every candidate solu-
tion, we use an ensemble of techniques for mating pool selec-
tion. For MOGA, we define three selection schemes: (i) Same
Rank Selection: In this selection scheme, we first create two lists
l1 and l2 by ranking the individuals based on each of the two
fitness criteria mentioned above. Let lx ← ixr where i is an
individual in list x with rank r. We pair two ‘i′s which have the
same r in the two lists, (ii) Inverse Rank Selection: This scheme
is the opposite of the previous one. One list is ranked from best
to worst and the other vice-versa. This makes sure that diver-
sity is maintained in the population and we do not constrain the
search space too soon, and (iii) Roulette Wheel Selection [21]:
In this scheme, the fitness score is used to compute a probability
of selection for each individual. If fi is an individual i’s fitness
score, then its probability of being selected is:
pi =
fi∑N
i=1 fi
(1)
where N is the number of individuals in the population. While
unlikely, individuals with high fitness scores may still be elim-
inated ensuring there is no premature convergence to local op-
tima.
Now, the NSGA-II selection procedure can be described as
follows: (i) select the k best individuals and move them to the
next generation without change, (ii) sort the other individuals by
their dominance and pick N − k individuals, and (iii) if candi-
dates of one pareto front are dominating, use crowding distance
to re-sort the individuals and maintain diversity
Once the mating pairs are identified using the above selec-
tion strategies, we use arithmetic recombination operators to
perform a single-point crossover [22]. If (p1, p2) is a mating
pair, then three children (C) are created where one has the char-
acteristics of the parents in equal proportion, and two are dom-
inated by each parent.
C =
p1 + p2
2
⋃ 2× p1 + p2
3
⋃ p1 + 2× p2
3
(2)
Figure 3: A pareto front showing the dominance of individuals
for a random audio sample
Thereafter, we perform mutation on each parameter of
every individual by adding Gaussian noise with a probability
probm so that the new population is scattered over a large area
in a different part of the search space thus reducing crowding
distance. Once a set of offspring is created, their fitness scores
are evaluated in the same way as described previously. The com-
bined set of parents and children are ranked using (i) domi-
nance scores in MOGA, (ii) dominance and crowding distance
in NSGA-II . The top N individuals are carried forward to the
next generation. This process is repeated until we reach termi-
nation.
3. Experiments and Results
We use the standard Mozilla Common Voice dataset (CVS) [23]
to test the effectiveness of our approach. Following [8, 14], we
take 100 instances from CVS and use them to perform both un-
targeted (make the ASR output as erroneous as possible) and
targeted (make the ASR generate a desired output) attacks. Ta-
ble 1 shows some examples of the original text generated by the
ASR systems (on the original audio sample), the target text (the
end goal) and the text generated from the adversarial input. In
this section, we present our implementation details along with
evaluation methods. We evaluate our approach in two ways: i)
quantitative – where we empirically prove the effectiveness of
the samples using WER and correlation coefficient (CC), and ii)
qualitative – where we show that humans find it difficult to dis-
tinguish between the original and adversarial samples by con-
ducting a survey.
3.1. Implementation Details
For each audio sample from the dataset, a set of 100 individuals
are created to form the initial population. They are initialized by
adding random uniform noise to the original audio signal with
Attack Metric ASR MOS+MOGA
MOS+
NSGA
Untargeted
WER ↑ Kaldi-ASR 3.9 4.68Deepspeech 5.4 3.7
CC ↑ Kaldi-ASR 0.97 0.97Deepspeech 0.98 0.98
Targeted
WER ↓ Kaldi-ASR 3.33 3.33Deepspeech 2.14 1.5
CC ↑ Kaldi-ASR 0.98 0.97Deepspeech 0.98 0.97
Table 2: Mean word error rates and correlation coefficients of
the ASR systems on original and adversarial samples. MOS
stands for multi-objective selection. (↑ - higher the better, ↓ -
lower the better).
a sampling rate of 16, 000. Therefore, a two-second audio clip
will result in individuals having 32, 000 genes. Intuitively, this
helps in faster convergence when compared to random initial-
ization.
After computing the fitness scores based on acoustic
(MFCC) and textual (edit distance) similarities, the population
is converted to a list of mating pairs. The extraction of MFCC
features is performed with window size of 25ms and a stride of
10ms. It is to be noted that an individual may appear in more
than one mating pair. The three crossover operations described
previously are applied to each pair to produce three children.
Probabilistic mutation is applied to every gene of every individ-
ual with probm = 0.005.
Next, the parents and children are combined and re-ranked
based on their dominance (and crowding distance in case of
NSGA-II) and the top 30 pareto-optimal individuals are prop-
agated to the next generation. This process is repeated for a
maxiters = 50, or until we get the same set of pareto-optimal
solutions over two successive generations which indicates con-
vergence. The most dominant individual from the last genera-
tion is the adversarial counterpart for our input audio signal. Af-
ter termination, there may be multiple, equally good dominant
solutions to pick from (with equal dominance). In this case, we
choose one at random as the best solution.
3.2. Quantitative Evaluation
For quantitative evaluation, we first compute the WER of the
original samples using an ASR System. For the selected 100
samples the WER of Deepspeech is 0.5 and Kaldi-ASR is 1.0.
After both un-targeted and targeted attacks are performed, the
new WER and CC are obtained for the adversarial samples
which can be seen in Table 2. For Deepspeech (Kaldi-ASR),
the WER degrades by 980% (368%) during un-targeted attacks.
Attack Original text Generated Text(original) Target Text
Generated Text
(attacked)
Un-targeted the one you are blocking the one you are blocking N.A. the money of locking
Un-targeted never mind about that never mind about that N.A. no i about that
Un-targeted what’s your name he asked whats yo name he asked N.A. one of late ask
Targeted i’ve got to go to him ive got to go to him a cat a cat
Targeted follow the instruction here follow the instruction here all of these all of these shapes
Targeted do you know what did you know that that I love you I love
Table 1: Texts generated by ASR systems on randomly selected audio samples and their adversarial counterparts
Figure 4: Word Error Rate comparison between human and ASR
transcribed text on adversarial samples
For targeted attacks, the target text snippets are generated
as follows: if the word length of the original sample text is n,
then a phrase whose length is the range of [2, n + 1] is chosen
randomly from the data to form the target text. In this situation,
the WER between the original and targeted text will be in the
range (n, n + 1) ≈ (5, 6). In this setting, the text generated
by Deepspeech (Kaldi-ASR) for the adversarial audio samples,
are on average 1.0 (1.83) words away from their target texts.
This suggests that even after only 50 generations, the generated
samples are quite close to their target. Table 2 also shows that
average CC is extremely high for both ASR systems, thus indi-
cating acoustic similarity between the original and adversarial
samples.
To compare our results with a previous state-of-the-art, we
use the model proposed in [14]. This grey-box system (it re-
quires access to the model’s loss function and final layer log-
its) can only perform targeted attacks. Using the same 100 au-
dio samples and target texts, the mean WER of this system
is observed to be 5.0 and the CC is 0.99. Compared to this,
our framework generates adversarial samples which are much
closer to their targets while having comparable acoustic simi-
larity.
3.3. Qualitative Evaluation
While quantitative evaluation empirically proves the goodness
of our framework using WER and CC, it is necessary to de-
termine if humans can be fooled with this approach. For this
purpose, a qualitative evaluation has been carried out by con-
ducting subjective listening tests with 27 participants.
These tests comprised of questions for evaluating an au-
dio sample on 4 aspects: (i) comprehensibility of content, (ii)
listening effort, (iii) presence of perturbations, and (iv) natural-
ness of generated samples. Each participant is presented with
24 random audio samples (from both targeted and un-targeted
attacks) and is required to transcribe the text and rate the listen-
ing effort required (from 1-4, with 4 denoting highest effort) to
comprehend the text. This provides an indirect measure of the
noise/aberrations present in the samples. The WER is calculated
for the transcribed text and compared with the ASR generated
text, with the original text being the ground truth. We obtained
225 data points to infer our insights from. Fig. 4 shows the WER
for the two ASR systems and human transcribed text. The mean
WER for the human transcribed text is 1.5 which clearly sug-
Figure 5: Listening effort required by the survey participants to
understand and transcribe the adversarial samples
gests that humans could not find any significant differences be-
tween the adversarial and the original samples.
Fig. 5 depicts the listening effort required by the partici-
pants to comprehend the audio. More than 80% of the partic-
ipants required little or no effort to comprehend the text, indi-
cating that there was either no or minimal audible noise in the
generated adversarial samples.
To evaluate the naturalness of the generated samples, we
asked the participants to distinguish between the original and
adversarial samples. They were able to correctly identify both
original and adversarial samples 50% of the time which is
equivalent to a random guess. To verify if humans can deter-
mine if the generated audio sample has been manipulated, the
participants were asked to listen to the generated samples and
determine if they were artificially generated or altered in some
manner. 73% said the audio sounded natural, whereas 27% said
that they could hear some ticks in the background which made
them believe that the audio could be synthesized.
Lastly, we conducted a transferability experiment to study
if the samples generated to fool one ASR system can do the
same to another system. The adversarial samples generated for
Deepspeech in an un-targeted setting were tested on Kaldi-ASR
and vice versa. In this setting, the mean WER of Kaldi-ASR
and Deepspeech are 1.9 and 3.6 respectively. This indicates that
though there are some common weaknesses between the two
ASR systems which can be exploited, there are other model
specific weaknesses which may be a result of the model’s in-
ductive bias or bias introduced by the training data. This is an
interesting research direction to pursue in the future.
4. Conclusion and Future Work
In this work, we introduce an algorithm agnostic framework for
attacking ASR systems using evolutionary multi-objective op-
timization. The framework is tested on two ASR systems and
is used for both un-targeted and targeted attacks. Our fitness
function decomposes adversarial audio quality evaluation into
two objectives: Euclidean distance of MFCC features to get the
acoustic similarity between audio samples and edit distance to
measure the generated text similarity. We show that MOGA and
NSGA-II can be plugged into the framework to generate ad-
versarial samples with high WER and CC. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first time a multi-objective fitness crite-
rion is used to optimize auditory and textual features jointly.
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